Defining creativity with discovery by Martin, Lee & Wilson, Nick
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Martin, Lee and Wilson, Nick. (2017) Defining creativity with discovery. Creativity Research 
Journal, 29 (4). pp. 417-425. 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/94117                     
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Creativity 
Research Journal on 30 October 2017, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10400419.2017.1376543   
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP url’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Defining creativity with discovery 
Lee Martin (corresponding author) 
Centre for Cultural Policy Studies 
University of Warwick 
Millburn House 
Coventry 
CV4 7HS 
Email: l.martin.4@warwick.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 (0)24 7652 8424 
Nick Wilson 
Culture, Media and Creative Industries 
Kings College, London.  
2.10 Chesham Building 
Strand Campus 
London  
WC2R 2LS 
Email: nick.wilson@kcl.ac.uk 
Tel: (+44) 20 7848 1052 
First submission May 27th, 2016 
Revision submitted 17th December, 2016 
!1
Abstract 
The standard definition of creativity has enabled significant empirical and theoretical 
advances, yet contains philosophical conundrums concerning the nature of novelty 
and the role of recognition and values in defining creativity. In this work we offer an 
act of conceptual valeting that addresses these issues and in doing so, argue that 
creativity definitions can be extended through the use of discovery. Drawing on 
dispositional realist philosophy we outline why adding the discovery and bringing 
into being of new possibilities to the definition of creativity can aid theoretical 
understanding and empirical investigation. Having outlined the case for defining 
creativity with discovery, three distinct types of discovery of possibility, within four 
domains of creative action, and two types of bringing into being are examined for 
their theoretical and empirical value. We conclude with reflection on future research 
into the identification and development of creative potential. 
Keywords: creativity, discovery, possibility, disposition, critical realism. 
Problems with novelty, values and recognition  
 Creativity is commonly defined through a collection of criteria that tend to 
consist of: producing something novel, which has value, is adaptive, is relevant to a 
problem and is recognised (Kaufman and Baer, 2012; Runco and Jaeger, 2012). 
Whilst originally proposed as a stop-gap (Stein, 1974), the criteria have become an 
invaluable means through which creativity research is conducted, despite awareness 
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of significant philosophical issues. For example, questions persist over the nature of 
novelty (Boden, 2004;  Epstein, 1991; Perkins 1994; Smith, 2005) and whether social 
values and recognition biases interfere with attributions of creativity (Adarves-Yorno, 
Postmes and Haslam, 2006; Adarves-Yorno, Haslam and Postmes, 2008; Charyton, 
Basham and Elliot, 2008; Corazza, 2016; Kasof, 1995; Ludwig, 1995; Runco, 1995). 
Whilst there is acknowledgement creativity exists before its recognition (Corazza, 
2016; Runco, 1995; 2003; Sternberg, 1995), in practice researchers require the 
recognition of these criteria from knowledgeable assessors in order to ensure 
creativity is being studied. Therefore, the question of what creativity is, outside of 
recognition, is still contested (Amabile, 1996; Boden, 2004; Corazza, 2016; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Martin and Wilson, 2014a; Policastro and Gardner, 1995;). 
Problems within three concepts of the standard definition have been identified: 
the nature of novelty, the role of effectiveness, whether defined through adaptivity or 
values, and whether recognition is necessary to the existence of creativity. These 
problems have received significant attention during seven decades of research but 
remain unresolved (Adarves-Yorno, Haslam and Postmes, 2008; Boden, 2004; Kasof, 
1995; Kaufman and Baer, 2012; Runco and Jaeger, 2012; Stein, 1974;). Starting with 
novelty, there are two philosophical conundrums. First, an explanation of the origin of 
creative novelty is currently lacking. Important advances have taken place in our 
understanding how the creative process works and this has undoubtedly advanced 
theory (Cropley, 2016; Leahy, 2016; Peilloux and Botella, 2016; Reiter-Palmon and 
Arreola, 2015; Sadler-Smith, 2015). However, the question of why novelty is possible 
at all, has remained difficult to answer. The philosophical issue of ex nihilo creation 
remains (Boden, 2004; Perkins, 1999) unless a non-contradictory explanation is 
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offered. In mechanical and rather unpoetic terms, we have identified how a creative 
“engine” works but lack explanation of the combustion within. Understanding why 
novelty is possible promises further insight into the creative process because a 
definition of creativity that does not comment on the origin of novelty is, 
philosophically speaking, incomplete.  
 Second, there is a need to understand how to separate creative novelty from 
other types of novelty. This debate is neatly summarised by Epstein’s (1991: 362) 
observation that, by some criteria, all things, events and people are novel. In other 
words, each moment of consciousness is unique and each thing produced has features 
never before in existence.  Subsequently, a requirement of creativity theory is to 
effectively separate creative novelty from all other types. The current solution is to 
define creative novelty as effective, adaptive or valuable to a particular context and 
particular people - especially those with trusted expert status (Weisberg, 2015). This 
approach brings practical and epistemological clarity, as gaining agreement from 
trusted experts offers a degree of validity and reliability within research (Li et al, 
2015; Long, 2014; Piffer and Hur, 2014). However, comment on the nature of creative 
novelty, independent of these knowledgeable experts, is problematic because of two 
fundamental philosophical issues. 
 First, the standard definition offers no comment on whether someone can 
know whether a new product is creative outside of its recognition. As 
Csikszentmihalyi questions (1999: 314), if an idea is not afforded recognition, can it 
be considered creative in the first instance? Such claims render creativity as having no 
recognition-independent criteria, even in abstraction. A variety of rater biases have 
been found in the laboratory, in organisational contexts, and across cultures (Kasof, 
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1995; Hong and Lee, 2015; Hoelscher and Schubert, 2015) and it is known that 
judgement of creative worth can be influenced by cultural environment, personal 
biases, through membership of social groups, such as gender, or class, and personal 
background or status (Adarves-Yorno, Haslam and Postmes, 2008; Charyton, Basham 
and Elliott, 2008; Kaufman et al 2010; Lau, Li, and Chu, 2004; Rocavert, 2016; Sayer 
2005; Silvia, 2008). Given these issues, relying on knowledgable judges to identify 
creativity can be problematic as it increases the chances of a success bias in theory, as 
there could be more ways to achieve creative outputs than are capable of being 
recognised (Rocavert, 2016; Runco, 2003).  
 Whilst there have been significant advances in the methods we use (e.g 
consensual assessment techniques) that can help account for issues of bias, they do 
not deal with the philosophical issue, rather they offer practical guidance to aid 
research. Theory therefore lacks criteria to differentiate a creative product, person or 
process from an uncreative one, outside of the capabilities of the researcher, or the 
prevailing cultural conditions. The criteria of adaptiveness (Barron, 1968; Runco and 
Jaeger, 2012), whilst also useful, must be defined in relation to the judgement of 
others and the values they hold, this means for Weisberg (2015) the same 
philosophical problem exists. For example, despite a clear lack of gender differences 
in creativity tests, women are under-represented in creative populations (Baer and 
Kauffman, 2008). This means they are being denied the economic, social and cultural 
benefits recognition brings. Developing our definition of creativity, without extending 
the concept into meaninglessness, must therefore continue to be a vital objective for 
theory development and will aid those seeking to democratise creative work 
(Rocavert, 2016).  
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 The second philosophical problem with recognition involves whether 
creativity is necessarily defined in respect of this criterion (i.e. there is no creativity 
without recognition), or it is merely a practical requirement that enables creative 
outcomes (products, processes, artefacts etc.) to be studied. In other words, there is a 
debate over whether recognition is an epistemological or ontological necessity. 
Epistemological necessity holds that recognition is required in order to know 
something is creative. For example, psychological theories of creative process and 
individual differences, as well as some organisational theory, tend to use recognition 
only as an epistemological or methodological tool (Li et al, 2015; Long, 2014; Piffer 
and Hur, 2014). The widespread use of consensual assessment techniques and the 
selection of eminent people into studies, reflect this epistemological necessity (Baer, 
Kaufman and Gentile, 2004; Moneta et al, 2010; Li et al, 2015; Long, 2014; Piffer 
and Hur, 2014).  
 On the other hand, theories that claim recognition as ontologically necessary, 
suggest creativity is a class of things that requires recognition. There is no creativity 
without recognition. Two types of theory are consistent with this argument. First, 
system theories suggest creativity is constituted as a relationship between a domain, 
field and person, whereby creativity exists as a system-level phenomenon 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). From this position, there can be no creativity without the 
system, which includes the field (gatekeepers and recognisers) and domains (rules 
that govern creative endeavours). Systems theory has undoubted theoretical merit and 
systemic influences on creative production have been identified (Csikszentmihalyi, 
2014). Whilst useful, it has a temporal problem. If creativity requires recognition, 
anything produced prior to recognition cannot be creativity without ontological 
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contradiction. This contradiction extends to claims made about the nature of creative 
potential and is an unresolved tension within the logic of systems theory (Runco, 
1995; 2006; Sternberg, 2006). Technical variations of systems theory have allowed for 
later recognition of historical significance (Dasgupta, 2011) but these do not resolve 
the temporal contradiction: prior to recognition, there can be no creativity. This jars 
with experience, as we know something is produced before gaining recognition. We 
also know mistakes in recognition are commonplace (Adarves-Yorno, Postmes, and 
Haslam, 2006; Licuanan, Dailey and Mumford, 2007). In addition, there is no 
comment on the origins of novelty within system theories, leaving the ex nihilo issue 
unexplained. 
The second type of theory that argues recognition is ontologically necessary to 
the existence of creativity can be broadly, and rather cumbersomely, categorised as 
social constructionist theory (Richards, 1996; Brown et al, 2010; Mcleod, O’Donohoe 
and Townley, 2009). The object of enquiry here is the sense-making, power or 
political processes that govern the label creative. Theories seek to explain and 
uncover the social, political and economic factors that influence attributions of 
creativity and in doing so, focus not on what creativity is, but on the sense-making 
and political processes that surround creative production and recognition (Kasof, 
1995). Explaining how creative novel outputs are possible, or offering criteria to 
identify creativity outside of expert recognition or political negotiation is not the 
function of such research. It is therefore consistent with this approach to consider 
creativity as being constituted through acts of recognition. 
Taken together, the issues concerning ex nihilo creation, the separation of non-
creative and creative novel events and the need for reference to adaptiveness and 
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recognition, mean creativity theory is still to offer a complete account of what creative 
novelty is, why it is possible and how to resolve the competing claims over the 
ontological status of creativity recognition. Rather than being abstract philosophical 
debates, they directly affect practice, as without effective criteria, the creative 
potential of the economically and socially disadvantaged is more likely to go 
unrecognised, resulting in impoverished theoretical explanations and the risk of 
wasted talent (Runco, 2006). 
The role of discovery for defining creativity.  
 Whilst new definitions of creativity have been offered that include alternative 
criteria, such as aesthetics and authenticity, (Kharkhurin, 2014), or that recognise the 
importance of potential within creative action and surrounding environments 
(Corazzo, 2016), recent developments in philosophy, entrepreneurship and education 
theory hold the promise of using discovery as a new criteria for defining creativity. 
Discovery generally refers to finding, rather than producing something, yet is 
commonly associated with creativity. Creativity, it is argued, can lead to discoveries. 
Researchers have explored different types of scientific discoveries (de Chumaceiro, 
1999) and generally argue it is the creative capabilities of scientists, such as Einstein 
or Darwin, which enabled their break-through discoveries.  
 However, whilst there is a tension between creativity and discovery (Tweney, 
1996) and discovery is often associated with both the creative process and its outputs 
(Darbellay, et al, 2014; Henderson, 2004; Orlet, 2008) the exact nature of the 
relationship between creativity and discovery has garnered little discussion. Recently, 
it has been suggested that creativity can necessarily be defined through discovery 
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(Martin, 2009; Martin and Wilson 2014a; 2014b) and that doing so resolves the 
philosophical issues within current definitions of creativity. Drawing upon the 
philosophical insights found within critical and dispositional realism (see Bhaskar 
1978; 2000; 2008) they argue using discovery can change the way creativity is 
defined.   
Dispositional realism is a philosophy of science with a radically different 
conception of causality compared to other realist philosophy. Dispositional 
arguments, when applied to creativity theory, result in the conclusion that all creative 
novelty, arising from human action, must be produced through a process of discovery 
and bringing into being of possibility. Bhaskar asked: What must the world be like in 
order for science (as the empiricist Hume understood it) to be possible? He argued 
that because causal relationships can be identified through scientific activity and it 
takes scientific work to identify these causal relationships, Hume erred in describing 
causation as only the constant conjunction of events (whenever x then y). Bhaskar 
noticed that if scientific work is necessary to identify conjunction events, other factors 
must interfere with such relationships. Whilst a seemingly obvious insight, he 
suggested Hume, Karl Popper and pragmatists, such as William James, were 
subsequently incorrect to argue ontology is inconsequential to the philosophy of 
science and theory building. 
 This is because if causes are separate from the effects they generate (i.e. even 
if x exists, y will not always be produced - due to intervening factors) then it follows 
that causes do not always result in events. This meant Hume’s acceptance of causes as 
only epistemic phenomena (when measured and seen, we can assume causality exists) 
was flawed. For Bhaskar, causes must be considered causal powers, ontologically 
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distinct from how we come to know causes. In other words, causes act continuously 
but are separate from the events they generate. From this insight, Bhaskar built a set 
of ontological arguments to form a dispositional realist philosophy of science that 
argues we inhabit a natural and social world that is pregnant with possibility.  
Bhaskar identified different types of causal powers or dispositions and these 
were extended through the work of Fleetwood (2009; 2011). Causal powers that are in 
existence but not producing effects were classified exercised causal powers. For 
example, a match has the causal power to produce fire but is not always producing 
fire. Un-exercised causal powers are those powers that could emerge but are yet to do 
so. For example, at birth we have the causal power to acquire language but the causal 
power to speak using language is not yet exercised. 
Next we move from exercised to actualised powers, or those actually 
producing their effects. For example, it is only when the exercised causal powers of 
an artist to use a brush skilfully is put into practice, that their causal power becomes 
actualised: they produce a painting. Finally, Bhaskar recognised that even when 
causal powers are exercised and actualised, these events may not be seen. Archer 
(2000) argues it is important not to conflate these different causal powers into only 
those causes that can be measured. In other words, the social world is not exhausted 
by measurement. Measurement may be necessary to identify and explain causal 
powers (epistemically) but causal powers continue to exist outside of measurement 
(ontologically). 
Using these arguments Martin (2009) and Martin and Wilson (2014a; 2014b) 
demonstrate that if the end result of creativity is valuable or adaptive novelty, then 
Bhaskar’s work can be used to explain why it is possible for such novelty to emerge. 
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A world of causal powers must hold the potential for new things to come into being 
and for things already in being to act in new ways. Specifically, the existence of un-
exercised and un-actualised causal powers means new things and new events are 
possible. New things or events emerge (see Elder-Vass, 2010: 13-39) from each of 
these types of causal power. In other words, novelty is possible because we live in a 
world of dispositional propensity that is pregnant with possibility.  
 There is a history to discussing potential within creativity studies. Un-
exercised causal powers could be used to describe creative capacity and exercised 
causal powers to describe unused creative capabilities (Acar and Runco, 2014; 
Corazza, 2016; Runco, 2006; Sternberg, Grigorenko and Singer, 2006). It has also 
been proposed that creativity must be defined through its potential (Corazza, 2016). 
However, the consequences of considering the world as one of dispositional 
propensity have not been used to add any additional criteria to our definition of 
creativity and this was identified as a crucial omission (Martin, 2009; Martin and 
Wilson, 2014a; 2014b).  
Novelty brought about by human action involves manipulating a dispositional 
world through a process of production to discover what is possible and to act to bring 
this possibility into being. A world of dispositional propensity means an additional 
criterion can be added to the definition of creativity, namely the discovery and 
bringing into being of possibility. Human creativity must always involve discovering 
what is possible within the propensity of the world and bringing this possibility into 
being. Such possibilities are ‘new’ in a variety of senses: (i) new to human knowledge 
(i.e. epistemologically new); (ii) new in the sense of an un-exercised power becoming 
exercised (e.g. new type of computer); or (iii) an exercised power becoming 
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actualised (e.g. new property of a thing discovered). 
 A creative idea can therefore be defined as the representation of possibilities 
contained within the causal powers of the natural and social world. In making sense of 
these possibilities, we are discovering them. It is important to add here that this is not 
to claim that such sense-making is always prior to bringing into being. We can make 
something (a new theory, a new object) and then make sense of its significance, or, we 
may discover possibilities and subsequently bring them into being. The process of 
sense-making can be a social process (Wilson, 2010). The discoveries can also be of 
the material world (as is the case in the natural sciences) and of the social world, 
including the world of ideas. This process of discovery and bringing into being is 
likely to happen iteratively, but it always necessitates awareness at some level. 
 Whilst the proposition that all creativity involves discovery is derived from 
abstract philosophical argument, it has practical consequences and is a falsifiable 
proposition. There should be no example of creativity without a discovery. Whilst this 
seems obvious for scientific creativity, discovery is not a common word used to 
describe the artistic creative process, despite artists frequently having their work 
described as a process of exploration, experimentation, or discovery (e.g. King, 2000; 
McKee, 2014; Prager, 2012; also Plato on anamnesis; William Blake on the process of 
engraving – see Quinney, 2010). An artist can discover new ways to communicate 
about the human condition, as well as the possibilities within the properties of their 
chosen medium. A musician discovers new combinations of sounds perceivable as 
melodies and engineers discover ways of using materials. In each of these 
circumstances there is a discovery, whether that be of the possibilities in natural 
materials, psychological states, aesthetic appreciation, or audience understanding.  
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Discovery of possibility also offers philosophical explanation of how novelty 
emerges. We do not create ex nihilo; our creations are bound by the material and 
social conditions that surround us. From this dispositional realist perspective the ex 
nihilo problem can be resolved in terms of creative possibilities. Any given case of 
creativity must have the potential to be realised prior to it actually happening. Human 
creativity is not concerned with the impossible, especially in endeavours such as 
entrepreneurship (Ramoglou and Tsang, 2016). It is a means of discovering what is 
possible. Discovery of possibility offers both an explanation of how novelty is 
possible and extends the definition of creativity.  
Crucially, it is not sufficient to theorise creativity solely in terms of the 
discovery of new possibilities. There is a further step that differentiates the process of 
creativity from mere discovery, namely bringing into being. It is in categorising the 
relationship between discovery of possibility and bringing into being that new 
opportunities for theoretical development and empirical research into creativity are 
made possible. This process of production takes place in embodied practices (making, 
doing, connecting, realising etc.) that give rise to new emergent causal powers, 
events, or explanations, which come into existence for the first time as the result of 
the practice being undertaken. Creativity is therefore re-defined as ‘the discovery and 
bringing into being of new possibility’. 
Introducing three types of discovering possibility 
 Extending the definition of creativity does not allow theory and research to 
progress unless it enables new research and it is to this challenge we now turn. An 
enormous variety of ‘new possibilities’ can be discovered which means theory needs 
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to cut through the complexity such variation brings. Dispositional philosophy offers a 
route to remove some of the complexity through informing a typography of 
possibilities, centred on the distinction between unexercised, exercised and actualised 
causal powers. First, the broadest level of disposition or possibility, an un-exercised 
causal power, can be used to categorise discoveries of entirely new things. The world 
contains within it the possibility for change but these possibilities are not endless, 
they are bound by existing dispositions (Ramoglou and Tsang, 2016). Therefore, the 
creative act is concerned with what new causal powers can emerge (i.e. be exercised). 
Possibilities of this type are associated with everything from new ideas, theories, 
inventions, technologies, consumer products, to art, music, literature, and cultural 
artefacts. As this type of causal power is yet to emerge and is therefore invisible to our 
senses, imagination or problem finding (Hu et al, 2010) are likely to be key 
capabilities for anyone seeking to discover them. 
Second, the possibilities held within the exercised but not actualised (i.e. 
acting) causal powers of things represent an entirely different type of discovery. The 
discovery of the ability of metal to conduct electricity provides a clear example. Metal 
could always conduct electricity, so this causal power did not come into being when it 
was accounted for in scientific theory. Metal had an exercised causal power, which 
was later actualised (i.e. it conducted electricity). In short, these discoveries involve 
asking what new events can be produced from existing causal powers. An altogether 
different example of this category concerns the performance of classical music. It is 
generally accepted that professional classical musicians are creative when 
reproducing and interpreting pieces of music. However the question of what is being 
created has led commentators and musicians alike to question how music can already 
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exist but be interpreted in a creative way (Wilson, 2014). Using the theory proposed 
here, we suggest that a musical work, made knowable, in part at least, to musicians in 
the form of a musical score, contains exercised causal powers that are then discovered 
once more and actualised in a novel performance. The new possibilities associated 
with old music are explicable in terms of this discovery of exercised causal powers 
and bringing into being a new actualised event. 
Finally, a third category involves the discovery of new explanations for fully 
exercised and actualised causal powers. The best examples of this category come 
from the domain of physics. Gravity has been operating around us unchanged, yet it 
was relatively recent in human history that we were able to explain this force. Gravity 
was not a hidden possibility, or a latent thing waiting to be brought into being. It is an 
exercised and actualised causal power and it has always been producing empirical 
events. Yet human creativity was necessary to discover what it was, and how it works. 
These types of discovery involve identifying explanations for causal powers that exist 
and act but we cannot explain why.
Domains of discovery: Material, agential, structural & analytical creativity 
Distinguishing three types of possibility can aid explanation of variation in 
creative processes. However, discovery and bringing into being of possibility applies 
to many contexts, so it is necessary to ask what new ideas, theories, and explanations 
are about, and what sort of practice, products and realisations are involved. Domains 
of discovery will therefore influence how bringing into being operates in practice. 
Archer (2000) identified several domains, relevant to creativity theory, which differ 
according to whether they concern the material, agential, structural or analytical 
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world. Analytically separating the natural and social world, through the lens of 
dispositional realism, into four domains of possibility enables variation in creative 
practices to be identified. Material creativity refers to discoveries of the natural world, 
agential creativity refers to discoveries of the self, structural creativity is concerned 
with discoveries within social structures, and analytical creativity is concerned with 
discoveries within abstract systems of thought.  
 Whilst it is possible to separate these domains in abstraction, in practice 
creativity happens within and across multiple domains. Great literature can 
simultaneously make discoveries (for author and readers alike) about the possibilities 
for explaining the human condition (self/structural), the process of expression (self/
structural/analytical) and an audience’s propensity to learn, grow, be influenced, or 
moved by a story (self/structural). Using domains of discovery in this way dovetails 
with research that suggests there are context dependent hierarchies of creativity, and 
with research that explores whether creativity is domain general or domain specific 
(Baer and Kaufman, 2005; Blazhenkova and Kozhevnikov, 2016; Feist, 2004; Julmi 
and Scherm, 2015; Simonton 2009). The addition of discovery of possibility and 
bringing into being to the definition of creativity, provides a new conceptual 
framework for researching how such hierarchies might interact within domains.  
Two types of bringing into being 
 The final insight dispositional realism offers is to distinguish two types of 
creative production, or processes of bringing into being. Creativity involves both 
intellectual and practical labour. Some creative work can be highly abstract and 
intellectual in nature (mathematics); other work is characteristically embodied 
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(theatre, dance); involves making and doing (production, design); or is more or less 
performative (the creative arts). Bhaskar described transitive objects as fallibly 
changing perspectives of the world (i.e. our ideas, theories and explanations about 
objects in the world). These are real, in the sense that they are objects of the social 
world but they are open to change as they are constituted through our cognition. On 
the other hand, intransitive objects, have an existence that can continue, regardless of 
the ideas we may hold about them. It is therefore possible to offer two further 
classifications of creativity around the nature of the work being done to bring into 
being new possibilities. 
 Creativity1 (ideas, theories, explanations etc.) involves the discovery of new 
possibilities, through bringing into being a conscious notion or idea that represents 
these possibilities. In other words, when we discover a new possibility in the 
transitive domain, we bring the idea of that discovery into consciousness. Creativity2 
focuses on the embodied practices, products, realisations of the material world, and 
involves bringing into being, or the realisation of an artefact, practice, or product that 
can exist independent of our cognition. In dispositional realist terms, the bringing into 
being involves a process of transforming un-exercised causal powers into exercised 
ones, or exercised causal powers into actualised powers. In practice, creativity often 
involves both the bringing into being of transitive ideas, as well as intransitive 
products. For example, when we refer to the invention of the smart-phone as an 
exemplar of creativity, we acknowledge the discovery of possibilities within our 
cognition, for example, the very idea of such a device with its multi-functions, touch 
screen, and so on, as well as the bringing into being of a new product (i.e. the smart-
phone itself). 
!17
Distinguishing creativity in this way is important because creative ideas can 
remain latent, especially when developing products that require financial, time or 
resource investment. An unpublished manuscript, an unexploited patent, or a script 
not produced are some of the many examples of creative work where ideas have been 
generated, possibilities uncovered but the realisation of value is unfulfilled. Taken 
together these insights into type and domain of discovery, combined with the two 
types of bringing into being, offer new opportunities to investigate whether discovery 
and bringing into being can aid causal explanation of creativity, the creative process 
and, especially, extending what can be considered as creative potential outside of 
recognition. In table 1 we offer a preliminary sketch of the types of research made 
possible through comparing two types of creativity (new literature and new 
computing technologies) and how the action involved can be different depending on 
the type of possibility, the domain of action and whether it involves the bringing into 
being of an idea, product, or both.  
<insert table 1 about here> 
Discussion 
 In this article, we offer an account of creativity that attempts to reconcile 
philosophical problems with novelty, value and recognition. Creativity is theorised to 
necessarily involve discovery of new possibility and bringing it into being. In order 
for adaptive or creative novelty to be produced and recognised, discovery of 
possibility and bringing into being must have occurred. Through doing this, new 
criteria with which to assess, explain and judge creativity have been proposed. Three 
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distinct types of discovery of possibilities are identified and four domains of activity 
proposed. This enabled two types of bringing into being to be classified: creativity1 – 
the bringing into being of creative ideas, theories and explanations; and creativity2 – 
the bringing into being of new embodied practices, products or realisations.  
Creativity is possible because we live in a world of dispositional propensity. 
We do not produce ex nihilo, we discover possibilities and bring the novelty they hold 
into being. This builds on work attempting to separate creative work from its 
recognition through offering additional criteria to aid understanding of the creative 
process. In the case of new ideas, theories and explanations (creativity1), these are 
brought into being through being discovered (i.e. revealed, uncovered, found). 
Creative products in the material world (creativity2), by contrast, require being 
discovered and bringing into being.  
A consequence of this analysis is to recognise that for creative work to bring 
about change, or have its value recognised, a double discovery must be made. First, 
the possibility for the creative product itself needs discovering and bringing into 
being. Second, its value needs recognising, or indeed discovering by an audience. The 
influence of creativity is contingent upon collaboration but this collaboration does not 
define creativity ontologically. However, the necessity of a double discovery, for 
change to occur, could mean that receivers of ideas need to have similar levels of 
creative capabilities in order to effectively discover value. Whereas creative 
collaboration, with recognisers in a domain, is currently considered prime facie 
evidence of the necessity of recognition for creativity to exist (McKerracher, 2016; 
Reisman, Keiser and Otti, 2016; Sarsani, 2008), the crucial advantage of this 
approach is that it follows that creative potential could be as needed as much within 
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those tasked with the recognition and reception of ideas, as those who produce it. This 
opens a promising avenue of research into the role of active audiences, beyond that 
recognised within the literature on co-creation teams. For example, Dufrenne, 1973 
argued that far from being a passive recipient of the music in a live performance, the 
audience can co-create the music through an act of discovery, in this case involving 
the discovery and bringing into being of an aesthetic object. 
Discoveries can be specified, domains identified, types of bringing into being 
understood and each of these criteria provides additional means through which the 
creative process can be understood. Creativity educators can therefore use this 
approach to understand whether all the capabilities required to be creative (i.e. make 
such discoveries, bring such things into being) are held within an individual or group. 
For example, one may have the means to make discoveries in a particular domain but 
lack the ability to discover how to win audience acceptance. Research has yet to 
conclude whether higher order or abstract categories of creativity can transcend 
domains. If such categories exist (Welling, 2007), this dispositional realist approach 
also offers a new method to identify which creative capabilities are domain general 
and which are domain specific, leading to the realisation of creativity training based 
on types of discovery and bringing into being attempted.  
Much is already known about discovery processes (Simon, 1980) but this is 
rarely applied to understanding creativity. For example, a vital implication of our 
approach to defining creativity is that discovery of possibility must presuppose 
awareness. The existence of possibilities is qualitatively different to awareness of 
them. Exploring the interaction between awareness and creative work seems to us a 
promising line of enquiry. Research that explores the present-moment awareness of 
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creative action, could extend further into everyday creative practice (Brown, 2008; 
Raina, 2013; see also Richards, 2007). For example, known discoveries, within an 
organised system (material, self, analytical etc.), could be used to analyse the 
conditions that foster awareness of discoveries, and those that hinder it. The 
implication being, greater understanding of discovery processes will directly enhance 
creative abilities, and training in awareness, or in the conscious representation of 
realistic problems (Cunningham and MacGregor, 2008) will enhance sensitivity to 
discoveries being made.  
A concluding thought is to suggest that the work done here might be of 
particular interest to those seeking to implement a more sustainable approach to 
human creativity. The rhetoric of creativity carries with it a lingering modernist focus 
on the shock of the new. Discovery, with its implicit alignment towards identifying 
and making more of what is already here, points towards a different conceptualisation 
where the promise, at least, of taking the sustainability agenda seriously, not as a nice 
to have adjunct, becomes a foundation of what we understand creativity to be. 
(5, 499 words, excluding references) 
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